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INCOMMENSURABLE GOODS, ALTERNATIVE
POSSIBILITIES, AND THE SELF-REFUTATION OF THE
SELF-REFUTATION OF DETERMINISM
MICHAEL BAUR
In his paper, "Free Choice, Incommensurable Goods and the Self-Refuta-
tion of Determinism,"' Joseph Boyle seeks to show how the argument for the
self-refutation of determinism-first articulated over twenty-five years ago2-
is an argument whose force depends on (first) a proper understanding of just
what free choice is, and (secondly) a proper understanding of how free choice
is a principle of moral responsibility. According to Boyle, a person can make
a genuinely free choice only if he is presented with alternative options that are
incommensurable in their goodness or desirability. If the goodness or desir-
ability of alternative options could be commensurated, or compared in
accordance with some common standard, then it would be possible in prin-
ciple for a person to determine which of the two options offered more, and
which offered less, of the same sort of good represented by the two options.
But if this sort of commensuration or comparison were possible, according to
Boyle, then there would really be no need to choose. Rather, the only task that
would have to be performed in order to determine the person's selection
among alternative options would be the task clarifying or calculating which
of the alternative options offered most fully what it is that makes both options
desirable in the first place. Once the clarification or calculation is done, there
would be no need-and in fact, no possibility--of really choosing: the
calculation alone would settle which option is the best option, and thus which
option is to be selected.
Now if genuinely free choice requires that the choosing person be presented
with options that are incommensurable in goodness or desirability, then it also
seems to be the case that genuine choice-and the moral responsibility that
goes along with it-requires that the person be presented with alternative
possibilities from which to choose. And yet some compatibilist thinkers have
held that moral responsibility does not really require the presence of
alternative possibilities. In particular, Harry G. Frankfurt has sought to show
(by means of counter-example) that a person can be a moral agent and morally
responsible, even if the person did not, in fact, have any alternative
possibilities available to him (that is, even if the person could not have done
1. American Journal of Jurisprudence 50 (2005) 139-63.
2. See, for example, Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, Free
Choice: A Self-Referential Argument (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1976).
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otherwise). Frankfurt's counter-example offers a direct challenge to the sort
of incompatibilism that Boyle seeks to defend; and so Boyle is quite right to
address Frankfurt head-on. For if Frankfurt is right, then it is erroneous to
hold "the principle of alternative possibilities" (the principle that a person can
be morally responsible for what he has done, only if he had alternative
possibilities, or only if he could have done otherwise). But if it is erroneous
to hold the principle of alternative possibilities, then it also seems erroneous
to hold the more robust position that Boyle wishes to defend: namely, the
position that moral responsibility requires not only alternative possibilities,
but also alternative possibilities representing options that are incommensur-
able in their goodness.
Boyle addresses Frankfurt's counter-example by making two observations.
First, Boyle observes that some actions can involve moral agency and moral
responsibility derivatively. For example, a person can be morally responsible
for an action--even in cases where there are no alternative possibilities
presently available to the person-provided that this present lack of alterna-
tive possibilities is itself the result of the person's prior choosing. Thus a
person can be morally responsible for avoiding a particular temptation- even
if that temptation does not presently emerge or is not presently felt by that
person-if the very non-emergence of that temptation is the result of some
prior free choice made by the person himself. While certainly true, this
observation about derivative moral responsibility does not really address the
Frankfurtian challenge-and Frankfurt would be quite prepared to
acknowledge the sort of derivative moral responsibility to which Boyle draws
our attention. What Frankfurt's counter-example aims to show is that one can
be responsible not only in the derivative manner that Boyle highlights, but
also in cases where there is no such derivative moral agency, i.e., in cases
where the absence of present alternative possibilities can not be traced back
to previous choices made by the person himself. This should be clear from
Frankfurt's own articulation of the counter-example:
Suppose someone-Black, let us say-wants Jones to perform a certain action.
Black is prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to
avoid showing his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is about to make
up his mind ... and he does nothing unless it is clear to him ... that Jones is
going to do something other than what he [Black] wants him to do. If it does
become clear that Jones is going to decide to do something else, Black takes
effective steps to ensure that Jones ... does do what he [Black] wants him to do.3
3. Harry G. Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," in Gary Watson,
Free Will, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 172.
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Black might exercise control over Jones in any number of ways--e.g., by
observing and, if necessary, manipulating Jones's brain activities-but the
point of the counter-example is that Jones cannot do otherwise if Black does
not allow him to do so. And yet if Jones decides on his own to do as Black
wants him to do (that is, if Jones decides to do something without any
intervention by Black), then Jones is genuinely responsible for what he did.
Accordingly, Frankfurt concludes that the principle of alternative possibilities
is false; in other words, he concludes that it is possible for a person to be a
moral agent and morally responsible for an action, even if he did not have any
alternative possibilities and could not have done otherwise.
In his second observation about Frankfurt's counter-example, Boyle
observes that what is crucial to our correct ascription of moral agency and
moral responsibility to a person is not so much the availability of actual
alternative possibilities, but rather the person's belief that there are alternative
possibilities. As part of this observation, Boyle makes a two-fold assertion:
(a) a person's belief that he has alternative possibilities is a necessary
condition of that person's being able to exercise moral agency and bear
moral responsibility: "If the agent knew that the option not allowed by the
controller was not available, then he could not choose it, or choose to try
for it. One cannot choose to do what one believes impossible. Now if that
is the only option allowed by the controller, the agent will presumably go
for the allowed option, but for the agent it is no longer an option, so here
there are no conflicting motivations, no selecting and no choice...."; and
(b) a person's belief that he has alternative possibilities is also a sufficient
condition of that person's being able to exercise moral agency and bear
moral responsibility: "if the agent believes that the option not allowed by
the controller is available, then he can make a free choice with respect to
it...."
Now Boyle seems to hold that the combination of (a) and (b) will allow him
to rebut Frankfurt's counter-example:
... I think to be plausible the counter-example requires that the agent believe that
the option not allowed by the controller is available. Without that belief there
is no choice but just a desire and perhaps a wish, but nothing that might lead us
to think the effective desire was a source of moral responsibility. In short, once
its unavailability comes to light, there is no choice and no obvious responsibility.
But if the agent believes the option not allowed by the controller is available,
then he can make a free choice with respect to it.4
4. Boyle, supra note 1, at 149-50.
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But it is precisely here that Boyle begs the question against Frankfurt. For
Boyle's appeal to (b) can help him to rebut Frankfurt, only if the notion of
"free choice" that is operative in (b) is taken to imply the existence of
alternative possibilities-and it is precisely this notion of free choice and
moral agency that Frankfurt seeks to undermine with his counter-example.
To see just how Boyle begs the question against Frankfurt, let us consider
the following passage from Boyle:
Ordinarily, one discovers that a belief in the existence of an option is a
mistake.... When one chooses such an option, plainly one is responsible for
choosing it; only the discovery that one cannot do it stops it from being an
ordinary choice and action. But if one did choose it from among options one
thought were available, one is so far forth fully responsible for what one did,
even if that was only vainly trying to do what one discovers impossible. So, one
can exercise agency among options one believes, even mistakenly, to be open.5
Notice that Frankfurt would fully endorse Boyle's concluding sentence here:
Frankfurt-like Boyle-would hold that (c) a person can exercise moral
agency and be morally responsible, even if that person wrongly believes that
there are alternative options open to him. But there is a crucial difference
between Boyle and Frankfurt on this point. Boyle holds (c) only because he
also holds that the person's very belief in the existence of alternative
possibilities-false though it may be-entails that there are alternative
possibilities for that person, or in that person's mind. If such alternative
possibilities did not existfor that person, then-for Boyle-there could be no
moral agency and no moral responsibility.
In his articulation of the problem, Boyle reveals an unexamined presup-
position which serves as a crucial premise in his response to Frankfurt; this is
Boyle's presupposition that the correct attribution of moral responsibility to
a person requires that the person choose from among (real or imagined) alter-
native possibilities: "Now if that is the only option allowed by the controller,
the agent will presumably go for the allowed option, but for the agent it is no
longer an option, so here there are no conflicting motivations, no selecting and
no choice." But by presupposing that the correct attribution of moral respon-
sibility to a person requires alternative possibilities (whether they exist in
reality or only in the person's mind), Boyle begs the question against
Frankfurt. For it is precisely this requirement of alternative possibilities
(whether real or imagined) that Frankfurt wishes to dispute. In other words,
Frankfurt-like Boyle-accepts (c), but his acceptance of (c) is not allied to
the disputed premise that one can correctly attribute moral responsibility to a
person only if there exist (either in the person's mind or in reality) alternative
5. Ibid., 150.
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possibilities (indeed, this is the very premise that Frankfurt seeks to challenge
with his counter-example).6
Now to say-as I have-that Boyle begs the question against Frankfurt is
not to say that Frankfurt's counter-example cannot be successfully challenged.
Indeed, I believe that Frankfurt's counter-example has been successfully
challenged, but on grounds quite different from those offered by Boyle.
Relying on what has been called "the indeterministic world objection," Robert
Kane7 has compellingly argued that Frankfurt's counter-example does not, on
its own, refute the principle of alternative possibilities. According to "the
indeterministic world objection," Frankfurt's counter-example can succeed
against the principle of alternative possibilities, only if one first assumes the
truth of determinism (only if one first assumes that the world within which we
humans live and act is not an indeterministic world). We can see why this is
so, if we return to the earlier example of Black and Jones.
In an indeterministic world, Black has a problem that Frankfurt does not
properly consider: the problem is that Jones's choice will remain undeter-
mined (and thus unknowable to Black) right up to the moment when Jones
actually makes his choice. If Black waits until Jones actually makes his
choice, then it will be too late for Black to intervene. In that case, Jones will
be responsible for his choice, since Black did not intervene; but by the same
token, Jones will have made his choice by selecting from among alternative
possibilities (for Black did not intervene and Jones's choice remained
undetermined right up to the moment of his making the choice). If, instead,
Black chooses to intervene so as to ensure that Jones will choose his (Black's)
preferred option, then Black will have to act in advance of Jones's actual
6. In his footnote 12, Boyle suggests that I misunderstand his response to Frankfurt
since-in (a), for example-I attribute to him a claim about the necessary conditions of moral
agency and moral responsibility, but then cite to a passage about the necessary conditions of free
choice. But notice the ellipses in my citations in both (a) and (b). These citations are not meant
to provide complete evidence for my attribution of propositions (a) and (b) to Boyle, but only
to point the reader in the direction of the relevant cluster of claims that Boyle makes. The
attentive reader will see that Boyle does indeed assert both (a) and (b) as premises in his
argument against Frankfurt. And to the extent that Boyle asserts (a) as a premise in his
argument against Frankfurt, he begs the question against Frankfurt, for (a) is the very premise
that Frankfurt's counter-example calls into question. Of course, Boyle's "dialectical" approach
which focuses on sufficient conditions for free choice and moral responsibility may help to
illuminate certain aspects of free choice and moral responsibility. But no account of what is
sufficient for free choice and moral responsibility can by itself yield the conclusion that the
having of (real or imagined) alternative possibilities is a necessary condition of free choice and
moral responsibility. And it is precisely this conclusion (about necessary conditions) that Boyle
must argue for, if he is to respond to Frankfurt without begging the question.
7. Robert Kane, A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 87-88; and Robert Kane, Free Will and Values (Albany, N.Y.:
SUNY Press, 1985), 51.
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choosing (for in an indeterministic world, Jones's choice remains undeter-
mined and thus unknowable to Black, right up until the moment of Jones's
choosing). Now if Black intervenes in this way in order to ensure that Jones
chooses Black's preferred option, it will certainly be true that Jones had no
alternative possibilities open to him; but it will also be true that Jones is not
morally responsible for the action thus brought about. In short, Frankfurt's
counter-example can refute the principle of alternative possibilities, only if
one also accepts the truth of determinism. Thus an indeterminist, incompati-
bilist thinker like Boyle can continue to accept the principle of alternative
possibilities without the least worry over whether the principle is directly
refuted by Frankfurt's counter-example.8
If I am correct, the preceding observations show not only why Boyle's
argument against Frankfurt is question-beginning, but also why Frankfurt's
refutation of the principle of alternative possibilities (if unsupplemented by
a separate argument for determinism) is itself unsuccessful. But furthermore,
I believe that the preceding observations might also reveal why Boyle's
attempted argument for the self-refutation of determinism is question-begging
as well, and indeed question-begging precisely for reasons presented in
Boyle's own account. Recall that, on Boyle's account, (a) a person's belief
that he has alternative possibilities is a necessary condition of that person's
being able to exercise moral agency and bear moral responsibility. But if
Boyle is correct about this, then moral agency and moral responsibility cannot
be correctly attributed to a person who undertakes certain actions with the
genuine belief that he has no alternative possibilities regarding those actions.
But the determinist genuinely believes that he has no alternative possibilities
when it comes to his belief in determinism. And so on his own account, Boyle
is wrong to hold that a moral norm is inescapably involved in the determinist's
belief in determinism. For given premise (a) in Boyle's own account, the
determinist is unable to exercise moral agency and bear moral responsibility
with respect to his belief in determinism, just so long as the determinist
genuinely believes that he has no alternative possibilities when it comes to his
belief in determinism. So if there really are any determinists in the world
(people who genuinely believe that they have no choice but to believe in deter-
8. In his footnote 10, Boyle suggests that (i) Frankfurt's original article on "Alternate
Possibilities," and (ii) the "lucky guesser" counter-example, provide sufficient rejoinders to "the
indeterministic world objection" [IWO] to which I refer. But it is generally recognized-now
even by Frankfurt himself-that neither Frankfurt's original article nor "lucky guesser"
scenarios provide adequate responses to the IWO. Just consider: if the "lucky guesser" scenario
is to serve as an adequate counter-example to the IWO, then the lucky guesser would have to
be much more than a lucky guesser; he would have to be an infallible Newcomb-type predictor.
And recent attempts to construct better Frankfurtian counter-examples by introducing
Newcomb-type predictors into indeterministic worlds have been highly problematic indeed.
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minism), then they must be---on Boyle's own account-unable to exercise
moral agency and bear moral responsibility when it comes to their belief in
determinism. Thus Boyle's latest elaboration--contrary to its own stated
purpose-may well have demonstrated why any self-refutation of determinism
is actually impossible.9
9. In his footnote 16, Boyle claims that my response to the argument for the self-refutation
of determinism [ASRD] proceeds "on the assumption that it [the ASRD] requires that those who
affirm that no one can make a free choice [NFC] are so far forth engaged in human agency that
involves free choice." But this claim is false. Boyle rightly observes that the ASRD does not
depend on the proposition that: "those who affirm that no one can make a free choice [NFC]
make a free choice in affirming this position." But I do not attribute that proposition to
him-nor do I need to do so. The crucial proposition that I attribute to Boyle is this: "if the
determinist believes that he has no alternative possibilities when it comes to his belief in
determinism, then-because belief in alternative options is a necessary condition for the
exercise of free choice and moral responsibility--the determinist is unable to exercise free
choice and moral responsibility when it comes to his belief in determinism." But if the
determinist is unable to exercise free choice and moral responsibility when it comes to his belief
in determinism, then-on Boyle's own account-there is no norm in force by which the
determinist can rationally or justifiably affirm NFC (or rationally believe in determinism). This
is because on Boyle's account (see, for example, Free Choice: A Self-Referential Argument,
163) there is in force a norm by which NFC can be rationally affirmed, only if the person to
whom the norm is addressed (in this case, the determinist) can make a free choice. But- once
again, on Boyle's account-if there is no norm in force by which the determinist can rationally
affirm NFC, then the determinist's affirmation of NFC is not rational (or not justified as a matter
of reasoned argument). This is because, on Boyle's own account, the affirmation of NFC (or
the belief in determinism) is rational or rationally justified, only if there is in force a norm by
which determinism can be rationally affirmed. So for Boyle, if the determinist believes that he
has no alternative possibilities when it comes to his belief in determinism, then he is unable to
exercise free choice and moral responsibility when it comes to his belief in determinism, in
which case his belief in determinism is not responsive to the required (freedom-presupposing)
rationality norm, and so is not a rational or justified belief or affirmation. For Boyle, it is the
determinist's very having of the belief that he has no choice but to believe in determinism, that
entails that the determinist's belief in determinism is not rational or justified. The problem with
Boyle's ASRD, then, is not that it rests on the proposition that Boyle says that I attribute to him.
The problem with the ASRD is that it presupposes what the determinist will not-and
cannot-concede, namely that the determinist's belief is not rational or justified (i.e., it is not
based on any rational affirmation), just so long as the determinist really does believe in
determinism (i.e., really does believe that he has no choice but to believe in determinism). And
so for reasons that Boyle himself gives, the attempted self-refutation can never be a self-
refutation of determinism, but only a refutation of determinism from the point of view of those
who already believe that determinism is false. This also explains the sense in which Boyle holds
that a moral norm is "inescapably involved" in the determinist's belief in determinism-not
because the determinist's belief actually is rational or justified (or based on an affirmation
responsive to a moral norm), but rather because the determinist presents his belief as rational
or justified, and (for Boyle) this very claim to rationality or justification necessarily involves or
implicates (or is inescapably subject to assessment on the basis of) a freedom-presupposing
(moral) norm about rational affirmation or justification.
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